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THE UNITED STATES’ WITHDRAWAL FROM
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
JURISDICTION IN CONSULAR CASES:
REASONS AND CONSEQUENCES
JOHN QUIGLEY*
INTRODUCTION
In 2005, the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol
to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. The Optional Protocol provides
for jurisdiction in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) when any
state party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
1
2
(VCCR) seeks to sue another state party for violating it.
Controversy over VCCR Article 36, which allows a foreign
national under arrest to contact a home state consul, prompted the
withdrawal. The United States had just lost two cases in the ICJ
arising out of situations in which police in the United States had failed
to observe consular access for arrested foreign nationals. The
withdrawal was a response to those ICJ decisions.
The withdrawal raised questions about the intent of the United
States to comply with its obligations under the VCCR. For a number
of years, the United States has taken a view of the consequences of
non-compliance with VCCR Article 36 that is at odds with the views
of other states party to the VCCR. The United States reads VCCR
Article 36 as affording less protection for a foreign national whose
consular access was not respected than do other states.
Many view the withdrawal as a significant reversal of U.S. policy
regarding U.S. participation in international dispute resolution
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1. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261 [hereinafter VCCR].
2. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 326, 596 U.N.T.S. 487, 488
[hereinafter Optional Protocol].
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mechanisms, particularly the ICJ, since the United States was an early
and strong proponent of compulsory dispute settlement for violations
3
of the VCCR.
The withdrawal limited the ability of the United States to sue
other states party to the VCCR for violations of the rights of U.S.
consuls and U.S. nationals. Lacking the Optional Protocol as a
jurisdictional basis, the United States is not likely to establish
jurisdiction over other states for violations of consular access rights or
4
any other aspect of consular law.
The withdrawal also raised legal issues, the most significant of
which deals with the validity of the withdrawal. Under international
law, it is unclear whether states are free to withdraw from a treaty
that does not expressly provide for withdrawal in a so-called
“denunciation clause.”5 The Optional Protocol contains no such
clause.
At the policy level, the withdrawal fueled charges that the
United States takes a unilateralist approach to international law. The
United States has been at odds with other nations in recent years on
6
issues ranging from military action to environmental protection. The
withdrawal from the VCCR Optional Protocol seemed to some as
one more example of a go-it-alone approach by the United States.
This Article examines the reasons for the 2005 withdrawal from
the VCCR Optional Protocol, why the United States deemed it
appropriate to change course from its earlier position, what the
withdrawal means for U.S. compliance with consular access
obligations, whether the withdrawal is legally valid, and what it may
mean for U.S. compliance with international law and participation in
international dispute settlement processes.
I.

THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE VCCR OPTIONAL
PROTOCOL

States that are party to the VCCR have the choice of adhering to
7
the Optional Protocol. By becoming a party to the Optional
Protocol, a state that is already a party to the VCCR gains jurisdiction
3. LUKE T. LEE & JOHN QUIGLEY, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 574-76 (3d ed. 2008).
4. See infra § I.
5. See infra § VIII(b).
6. See Paul Kevin Waterman, Note, From Kyoto to ANWR: Critiquing the Bush
Administration's Withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 749, 759 (2003).
7. See Optional Protocol, supra note 2, art. 1.
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in the ICJ to sue any other state party for any violation of the VCCR,
but at the same time, such a state opens itself up to being sued by
8
other states party to the VCCR for any violation of the VCCR. The
operative provision of the Optional Protocol reads:
Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the
[Vienna] Convention [on Consular Relations] shall lie within the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and
may accordingly be brought before the Court by an application
made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present
9
Protocol.

By adhering to the VCCR and the Optional Protocol, as it did in
1969, the United States gained a right to sue other states for VCCR
violations and conversely exposed itself to being sued for VCCR
violations by other states that are party to both the VCCR and the
Optional Protocol.
The VCCR Optional Protocol provides the principal
jurisdictional base whereby the United States sues and can be sued
for consular law violations. This is so because the United States is not
currently subject to the ICJ’s so-called compulsory jurisdiction, under
which states that file a declaration with the ICJ may sue other states
10
that have filed such a declaration and, in turn, can be sued by them.
Hence, the withdrawal, if valid, effectively insulated the United States
from future consular lawsuits but also deprived it of the possibility of
suing other states.
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice effected the withdrawal
in a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Annan circulated
the letter to the other states party to the Optional Protocol and
posted an item about the letter, which he called a “communication,”
on the website he maintains for activity relating to treaties. The
posting read:
On 7 March 2005, the Secretary-General received from the
Government of the United States of America, a communication
notifying its withdrawal from the Optional Protocol. The
communication reads as follows:
“. . . the Government of the United States of America [refers] to
the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes,
done at Vienna April 24, 1963. This letter constitutes notification
by the United States of America that it hereby withdraws from the

8.
9.
10.

See id.
Id.
See infra note 140.
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aforesaid Protocol. As a consequence of this withdrawal, the
United States will no longer recognize the jurisdiction of the
11
International Court of Justice reflected in that Protocol.”

The United States sent its communication to the U.N. SecretaryGeneral because that official is designated in the Optional Protocol as
the depositary agency. That means that states adhering to the
Optional Protocol communicate their adherence to the U.N.
Secretary-General,12 who then notifies existing states party of new
adherences.13
As mentioned previously, some treaties contain a denunciation
clause that specifies that states have the right to denounce, or
withdraw, from the treaty at their sole discretion, typically with a
proviso that they provide notice prior to the date of effectiveness of
the denunciation.14 Denunciation clauses typically designate the
depositary agency as the recipient to which a state would
communicate its denunciation. The Optional Protocol has no
denunciation clause and, hence, no provision about how to
15
communicate a denunciation. The United States nonetheless chose
the Secretary-General as the recipient of its communication.
II. SUITS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IN THE ICJ
ICJ suits against the United States were the precipitating factor
16
in its withdrawal from the Optional Protocol. The United States had
been sued in 1998, in 1999, and again in 2003 by states party to the
VCCR who alleged violations of VCCR Article 36, which relates to a
consul’s role in aiding nationals who are arrested.17 In each case,
jurisdiction was based on the Optional Protocol, and each plaintiff
state alleged that the United States had failed to fulfill its consular
access obligation toward one or more of its nationals.18 In the
terminology of consular law, the state in which such a person is
arrested is called the “receiving state,” since it “receives” a consul of

11. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, ch. 3, § 8
n.1 (Nov. 11, 2008), http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx.
12. Optional Protocol, supra note 2, arts. VI, VII.
13. Id. art. IX.
14. The terms “denunciation” and “withdrawal” are used interchangeably in regard to
treaties. “Denunciation” is the term used traditionally, but more recently “withdrawal” has
come to be used as an equivalent.
15. See Optional Protocol, supra note 2.
16. See infra § III.
17. See infra test accompanying note 19.
18. See id.
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another state. The national’s home state is called the “sending state,”
since it “sends” its consul. Under VCCR Article 36, when a sending
state national is arrested, the receiving state must allow the sending
state national and a sending state consul to communicate with each
other. VCCR Article 36 reads:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions
relating to nationals of the sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with
nationals of the sending State and to have access to them.
Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom
with respect to communication with and access to consular
officers of the sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving
State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the
sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that
State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending
trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication
addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in
prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said
authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the
person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of
the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to
converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal
representation. They shall also have the right to visit any
national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or
detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment.
Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action
on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if
he expressly opposes such action.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall
be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations
of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however,
that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect
to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded
19
under this Article are intended.

In each of the three cases filed against the United States, a state
party to the VCCR alleged that its national (or nationals) had been
arrested in the United States, but was (or were) not advised, as the
last sentence of VCCR Article 36(1)(b) requires, of the right of

19.

VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36.
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consular access.20 In all three instances, these nationals were then
21
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. These states argued
before the ICJ that the violation, which in all but a few instances was
not contested by the United States, necessitated some court action to
provide a remedy. In two of the three cases, the plaintiff state argued
that VCCR Article 36 afforded a right not only to it as a state, but as
well to its foreign nationals as individuals, that the foreign national be
advised of his or her right, and that this right could be asserted in a
court of the receiving state in case of violation.22 The United States
took the contrary position before the ICJ, maintaining that while
VCCR Article 36 creates rights and obligations between the sending
and receiving states, it does not create a right that adheres to the
foreign national as an individual. In its view, when a foreign national
is not advised about consular access, the rights of the sending state,
not the foreign individual, are violated, hence no judicial remedy is
required.23
Courts in the United States, at the urging of the Department of
State and Department of Justice, generally have interpreted VCCR
Article 36 in line with the U.S. government’s view.24 Thus, when
foreign nationals have sought a judicial remedy for a violation, state
and federal courts in the United States have typically held either that
they have no right or that, even if they have a right, they are not
entitled to a remedy.25 Other courts have rejected such claims by
foreign nationals on the basis that even if they have a right and are
entitled to a remedy, prejudice must be found to have flowed from
the violation, and because the courts did not find prejudice, the
particular foreign national was not entitled to a remedy.26 Still other
courts have rejected such claims on the basis of so-called “procedural

20. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.),
1998 I.C.J. 248 (Order of Apr. 9); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (Judgment of
June 27); Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12
(Judgment of Mar. 31).
21. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention (Order of Apr. 9), 1998 I.C.J. at 249;
LaGrand (Judgment of June 27), 2001 I.C.J. at 478-80; Avena (Judgment of Mar. 31), 2004 I.C.J.
at 39.
22. See LaGrand (Judgment of June 27), 2001 I.C.J. at 492-93; Avena (Judgment of Mar.
31), 2004 I.C.J. at 42-43.
23. See LaGrand (Judgment of June 27), 2001 I.C.J. at 493.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885-86 (9th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F.Supp.2d 1250 (D. Utah 1999).
25. See, e.g., Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 885-86.
26. See, e.g., Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F.Supp.2d at 1253.
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default”— that the claim was filed beyond the stage in the criminal
27
process by which claims of illegality must ordinarily be filed.
Three states sued the United States in the ICJ after U.S. courts
rejected the claims of their foreign nationals, and in each case before
the ICJ, the outcome favored the plaintiff state. In the 1998 suit filed
by Paraguay over the impending execution of a national, Angel
Breard, who had been convicted of murder in Virginia, Paraguay
asked for an injunctive ruling, which the ICJ issued, calling on the
28
United States to stop the execution. Both Paraguay and Breard
asked the U.S. Supreme Court to enforce the ICJ ruling, but it
29
declined. Breard had not raised his consular access claim in the
courts of Virginia, since his lawyers apparently were not aware of
consular access. The U.S. Supreme Court said that federal courts
would not consider Breard’s consular access claim, since it had not
been raised in a Virginia court.30 U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright, stressing the U.S. need to gain consular access for U.S.
nationals, asked the Governor of Virginia to postpone the execution,
but she did not take the position that Virginia was legally required to
31
do so. The Governor ignored this request, and Breard was executed.
The ICJ continued consideration of the case, even after Breard’s
execution, but Paraguay dismissed the case some months later, so no
final judgment was issued.32
The 1999 filing by Germany did result in a final judgment.
Germany sued over a failure to advise as to consular access in a case
involving two German nationals—brothers named LaGrand—who
33
were convicted of murder in Arizona and sentenced to death. One of
the two brothers had been executed by the time Germany filed, and
the other’s execution was imminent. The ICJ again issued an
injunctive ruling, instructing the United States to postpone the
34
execution while the case was pending. Like Paraguay before it,

27. See, e.g., State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St. 3d 49 (2001).
28. Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998
I.C.J. 248, 249, 258 (Order of Apr. 9).
29. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
30. Id. at 375.
31. Letter from Madeleine K. Albright to James S. Gilmore (Apr. 13, 1998), in DIGEST OF
U.S. PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1991-1999 ch. 2 (consular and judicial assistance and
related issues, item 16), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/org-anization/65744.pdf.
32. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.),
1998 I.C.J. 426, 427 (Order of Nov. 10).
33. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 475, 478-80 (Judgment of June 27).
34. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9, 16 (Order of Mar. 3).
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Germany asked the U.S. Supreme Court to implement the injunctive
35
ruling, but again the Supreme Court declined. The second brother
was executed. Germany continued with the case before the ICJ,
resulting in the ICJ’s first judgment in a claim relating to a violation
of consular access. The ICJ concluded that VCCR Article 36 gives a
right to a foreign national to be advised about consular access, and
that when that right is violated, the receiving state must review the
case to determine whether a remedy is required.36 Thus, the ICJ
rejected the U.S. position both as to a right and as to a remedy.
Germany also asked the ICJ to rule that the United States
violated Germany’s rights by failing to comply with the injunctive
37
ruling. The ICJ had never decided the question of whether such
rulings are binding, and the United States argued that they were not.
The ICJ agreed with Germany and held the United States liable on
the additional ground of failing to comply with the injunctive ruling.38
Hence, on two issues the ICJ found against the United States.
In 2003 Mexico sued on behalf of a much larger number of
nationals. It alleged that fifty-four Mexican citizens on death rows in
nine states of the United States had not been advised about consular
39
access. The ICJ, at Mexico’s request, issued an injunction to stop the
executions during the pendency of the case of three individuals, for
40
whom execution dates might have been set soon.
41
Mexico asked the ICJ to rule that the convictions be reviewed.
In its response, the United States conceded that, in all but two
42
instances, advice about consular access had not been given. The
United States argued, responding to Mexico’s claim, that review of
the allegations could be handled in the executive clemency process
and need not be done by a court, pointing out that the ICJ had not
previously specified which forum should review potential consular
access violations.43 The ICJ ruled, however, that a judicial forum was
35. Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 112 (1999).
36. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 494 (Judgment of June 27).
37. Id. at 498.
38. Id. at 516.
39. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12,
24 (Judgment of Mar. 31). The number for which claims were being made was subsequently
reduced to fifty-two. Id.
40. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 77,
90-92 (Order of Feb. 5).
41. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 55 (Judgment of Mar. 31).
42. Id. at 50.
43. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.A.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 514 (June 27).
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the most appropriate and that a court in the United States should
44
review the cases of the named Mexican nationals.
Of the Mexican nationals named in the ICJ case, the first to go
before the U.S. Supreme Court seeking implementation of the ICJ
45
judgment was José Medellin, then on death row in Texas. In
February 2005, shortly before a scheduled oral argument in the
Supreme Court in Medellin’s case, President George W. Bush issued
a memorandum to the U.S. Attorney-General relaying his position
that the cases of the Mexican nationals named in Mexico’s suit should
be reviewed by courts of the states in which they had been convicted.
The President’s memorandum stated:
the United States will discharge its international obligations under
the decision of the International Court of Justice . . . by having state
courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general
principles of comity in cases filed by the . . . Mexican nationals
46
addressed in that decision.

A few weeks later, Secretary of State Rice sent her letter, referenced
above, to the U.N. Secretary-General to withdraw from the Optional
Protocol.
III. DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXPLANATION OF THE
WITHDRAWAL
Secretary Rice made clear that it was the content of the ICJ’s
decisions that led the United States to send the letter of withdrawal:
In a statement she explained that while the United States considered
the VCCR “extremely important,” its objection was to the
interpretation by the ICJ: “this particular optional protocol was . . .
being interpreted in ways that we thought were inappropriate.”47 Rice
accurately noted that only about 30 percent of the 166 states then
48
party to the VCCR were also parties to the Optional Protocol.
Another State Department spokesperson, Darla Jordan, focused
on the content of the ICJ decisions. She said that they interfered with

44. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 66.
45. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 543 U.S. 1032 (U.S. Dec.
10, 2004) (No. 04-5928).
46. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 41-42,
Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928). The President’s reference to “its
international obligations” was to the United States’ obligation to comply with an adverse
decision of the ICJ, an obligation found in U.N. Charter art. 94.
47. Hugh Dellios, Rice Reaches across to Mexico; Defends U.S. Quitting Part of Consular
Pact, CHI. TRI., Mar. 11, 2005, at C4.
48. Id.
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the prerogatives of the courts of U.S. states, especially their
imposition of death sentences: “The International Court of Justice
has interpreted the Vienna Consular Convention in ways that we had
not anticipated that involved state criminal prosecutions and the
death penalty, effectively asking the court to supervise our domestic
criminal system.”49
Jordan further explained that the withdrawal was aimed at:
“protecting against future International Court of Justice judgments
that might similarly interpret the consular convention or disrupt our
domestic criminal system in ways we did not anticipate when we
50
joined the convention.”
At a State Department press briefing, still another spokesperson,
J. Adam Ereli, explained more fully the reasons for the U.S.
withdrawal from the VCCR Optional Protocol:
QUESTION: Adam, can you discuss a bit about the rationale
behind the Administration’s decision to withdraw from the optional
protocol to the Geneva [an apparent inadvertent reference to
‘Geneva’ instead of ‘Vienna’] Conventions which give the
International Court of Justice a measure of jurisdiction in U.S.
capital cases? There’s already criticism that this is part of a
continuing trend of unilateralism
MR. ERELI: Right. Well, let me address that latter criticism first. I
don’t think anybody should conclude by our decision to withdraw
from the optional protocol that we are any less committed to the
international system or that we are in any way walking back from
international commitments. To the contrary, we remain a part of
the Vienna Convention, we remain committed to fulfilling its
provisions and we stand by it.
Second of all, the International Court of Justice, pursuant to a
dispute referred to it under the optional protocol, rendered a
judgment in the Avena case dealing with how state courts in the
United States handled certain capital cases where foreign nationals
claimed consular access. The decision that the ICJ handed down is
a decision, frankly, that we don’t agree with.
Yet, in recognition of the optional protocol and our international
commitments, the President has determined that the United States
will comply with the judgment of the International Court of Justice

49. Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases; Foes of Death Penalty Cite Access
to Envoys, WASH. POST, March 10, 2005, at A1.
50. Id.
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and that we will review—our state courts will review—the cases
that ICJ responded to.
However, we would also note that when we signed up to the
optional protocol, it was not anticipated that this—that when you
refer a case—cases that would be referred to the ICJ and the ICJ
would use the—and the optional protocol would be used to review
cases of domestic criminal law.
This is a development, frankly, that we had not anticipated in
signing up to the optional protocol and that we, frankly—we—and I
would note, you know, 70 percent of the countries that are
signatories to the Vienna Convention also decided not to sign up to
the optional protocol so it’s not just the United States going against
everybody else. I mean, we are in a sense joining an existing
majority in not participating in the optional protocol and the reason
is because we see the optional protocol being used by people or
going in directions that was not our intent in getting involved.

I mean, so the bottom line is we believe in the international
system, we are a committed participant in the international
system, as reflected by our continued commitment to the
Vienna Convention and its provisions, as well as our decision
to comply with the judgment. But at the same time, we see
that in this specific case, and in the use of optional protocol,
frankly, the way it’s being interpreted, the way it’s being
used, go against the ideas — the original ideas that we signed
up for.
QUESTION: But this protocol came in handy for the United States
during the Iran hostage crisis. Then there's criticism that we're now
cherry-picking the provisions that we like and don't like, that this
might be short-sighted in the long-run.
MR. ERELI: Well, again, I don't think we're cherry-picking. I
think that this is a really unexpected and unwelcome precedent
where people who don't like decisions of our state courts can use an
international court as a court of appeal. And that doesn't make any
sense at all. And so what we're talking about is, we've got a system
of justice that works in the United States and I don't think you
should compare it to other countries, like Iran in 1979. We have a
system of justice that works. We have a system of justice that
provides people with due process and review of their cases. And it's
not appropriate that there be some international court that comes
in and can reverse the decisions of our national courts.
...

273
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QUESTION: But why does the United States on the one hand
decide to, you know, go along with this ruling to review these cases
and then just days later decide to pull back?
MR. ERELI: Because, precisely because, we respect the
international system, because we respect the authorities and the
jurisdictions of international institutions when we sign up to those
international—when we sign up and submit ourselves to those
jurisdictions. So it shows that, look, even though we don’t like
something, even though we think it’s wrong, if we submitted
ourselves to that jurisdiction freely and according to international
obligations, then we will honor those international obligations. I
mean, that’s why we are complying with the case.
But we’re also saying in the future we’re going to find other ways to
resolve disputes that come under the Vienna Convention other
than submitting them to the ICJ. We’ll do something else. So we’re
still committed to the Vienna Convention. We’re still committed to
upholding its principles and fulfilling our obligations under that
convention. What we are saying is when there are questions about
that, we’ll seek to resolve them in a venue other than the ICJ.
Given that the ICJ in this case, as well as the Lagrand case,
established a precedent of using this mechanism to affect our
51
domestic legal system.

The Department’s position, thus, was that the United States
would comply with Avena but would no longer submit to ICJ
jurisdiction, in part because the Department was concerned over the
construction given to VCCR Article 36 by the ICJ.
IV. THE CHARGE OF UNILATERALISM
The United States had been subject to frequent criticism for
allegedly taking advantage of its position as the remaining
superpower and acting unilaterally rather than cooperatively in
international affairs. The U.S. stance on consular access, even prior to
the 2005 Optional Protocol withdrawal, had put the United States at
odds with other states.52 Its positions on whether VCCR Article 36
provides for an individual right and whether a consular access
51. Regular State Department Press Briefing, Mar. 10, 2005, distributed by FEDERAL NEWS
SERVICE.
52. See, e.g., Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v.
U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Order of April 9); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466
(Judgment of June 27); Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
2004 I.C.J. 12 (Judgment of Mar. 31).
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violation calls for a judicial remedy had not been echoed by other
parties to the VCCR. To the contrary, other states had been vocal in
53
condemning the United States for these positions.
Foreign governments, starting in the mid-1990s, entered
diplomatic protests with the Department of State when their
54
nationals faced execution. Beyond diplomatic protest, which is a
traditional form of objection by one state against another, a number
of states also directly approached governors who held the final say as
to whether an execution would proceed.55 They also filed amicus
curiae briefs in state and federal courts in support of the claims of
56
foreign nationals for a remedy for a consular access violation. The
filing of briefs by foreign governments is an unusual form of making a
position known. It is not done lightly, as it implies criticism of the
receiving state.57 These filings thus reflected the fact that the U.S.
position, which was being followed for the most part by U.S. courts,
was on the international radar screen as an issue on which the United
States was out of line with other states.
Most states that filed briefs did so in cases involving their own
nationals, but some filed in support of nationals of other states, which
was an even more unusual measure that further reflects the strength
58
of the view of those states that the United States was out of line. In
addition, foreign states even filed as groups of states, and in one U.S.
Supreme Court case, a group of thirteen Latin-American states filed a
brief seeking a judicial remedy for a consular access violation.59 In the
same case, the European Union filed such a brief that was backed not

53. See infra notes 55-57.
54. Letter from José del Carmen Ariza, Ambassador of the Dominican Republic, to
Warren Christopher, U.S. Sec’y of State (Mar. 15, 1993) (on file with author).
55. Letter from José del Carmen Ariza, Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, to Ann
Richards, Governor of Texas (Mar. 15, 1993) (on file with author).
56. See, e.g., Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that Mexico filed a
brief). See also Standt v. City of New York, 153 F.Supp.2d 417, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (listing a
number of briefs filed by other states).
57. On protests in support of a co-national, see generally 1 L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 786 (8th ed.1955).
58. See, e.g., Illinois v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423 (Ill. 2000) (noting a brief by Mexico in
support of position of Poland in regard to a national of Poland).
59. Brief of Foreign Sovereigns in Support of Petitioner, Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660
(2005) (No. 04-5928). Mexico filed a separate brief in support of petitioner. Brief Amicus Curiae
of the Government of the United Mexican States in Support of Petitioner Jose Ernesto
Medellin, id.
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only by its then twenty-five member states, but also by an additional
60
twenty-one other European states.
A. The U.S. Position on Rights under VCCR Article 36
No state in the international community, including the closest
allies of the United States, strayed from the chorus of criticism or
came to the defense of the U.S. positions. These other states, as
reflected in their filings, said that VCCR Article 36 guarantees a right
to an arrested foreign national, given that VCCR Article 36(1)(b)
uses the term “rights” to refer to a foreign national’s consular access.
They relied on the ICJ’s conclusion on this point.61
The United States, in making its argument that no individual
right is accorded, cited a phrase in the preamble to the VCCR that
reads: “Realizing that the purpose of such privileges and immunities
is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of
functions by consular posts on behalf of their respective States . . . .”62
It used that language to assert, in advising U.S. courts on how to deal
with a consular access violation, that “[t]he right of an individual to
communicate with his consular officials is derivative of the sending
state’s right to extend consular protection to its nationals,” and
therefore the VCCR does not establish “rights of individuals.”63
Preamble clauses may legitimately be used to clarify the meaning
of a treaty’s provisions, yet the particular U.S. argument ran up
against the fact that the “privileges and immunities” identified in
various provisions of the VCCR apply to consular officers, family
members, and employees, who enjoy them so that a consulate can
carry out its work without excessive interference by the receiving
64
state. Consular officers are, for example, exempted from paying
income tax in the receiving state on the salaries they receive from the

60. Brief of Amici Curiae the European Union and Members of the International
Community in Support of Petitioner, id.
61. Brief of Foreign Sovereigns in Support of Petitioner, id.; Brief Amicus Curiae of the
Government of the United Mexican States in Support of Petitioner Jose Ernesto Medellin, id.;
Brief of Amici Curiae the European Union and Members of the International Community in
Support of Petitioner, id.; see to same effect LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.A.), 2001 I.C.J. 466,
494 (June 27).
62. VCCR, supra note 1, pmbl.
63. Letter from David Andrews, Legal Adviser, Department of State, to James K.
Robinson, Assistant Attorney General, attachment a, at A-3: Department of State Answers to
the Questions Posed by the First Circuit in United States v. Nai Fook Li, available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/6151.htm.
64. See VCCR, supra note 1, pmbl.
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sending state.65 Additionally, they have certain privileges if a criminal
66
case is filed against them, and their confidential correspondence
cannot be read by the receiving state.67
Contrary to the assertions of the Department of State in the mid1990s, this range of applicability of the preamble phrase had been
recognized by the Department of State delegation that represented
the United States at the 1963 conference at which the VCCR was
drafted. The delegation informed the U.S. Senate during the Senate
process leading to ratification of the VCCR that this preamble phrase
referred to “officers, members of families, and employees” of
68
consular posts.
Moreover, at the 1963 drafting conference it was clear that this
preamble phrase did not apply to sending state nationals who might
require consular services. The phrase was included in preamble
69
language proposed by six delegations at the conference. The
delegate of Ghana, one of the proponents, explained: “A really
appropriate preamble to the convention on consular relations must
include a reference to the basis on which consular officials enjoyed
certain privileges and immunities.”70
The drafters’ concern was that privileges and immunities for
consuls was a delicate subject in some third-world states, since in the
age of colonialism many European states arranged extensive
71
exemptions from local jurisdiction for their consuls. In those states’
view, and in that of the states who acknowledged the concern, the
point of the preamble phrase was to make clear that the privileges

65. Id. art. 49.
66. Id. arts. 41-42.
67. Id. art. 35. See also LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 3, at 341-511.
68. Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference on Consular
Relations, Vienna, Austria, Mar. 4-Apr. 22, 1963, in Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
with Optional Protocol, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Executive E (U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington 1969) 41, 46.
69. U.N. Conference on Consular Relations, Vienna, Austria, Mar. 4-Apr. 22, 1963,
Argentina, Ceylon, Ghana, India, Indonesia and United Arab Republic: proposed preamble to the
Convention, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/C.1/L.71 (Mar. 8, 1963).
70. Id., First Comm., 29th mtg., Mar. 26, 1963, Consideration of the draft articles on
consular relations adopted by the International Law Commission at its Thirteenth Session
(A/CONF. 25/6), ¶ 10.
71. See Id. ¶ 3. Tunisia, which initially opposed inclusion of this preamble phrase, regarded
privileges and immunities for consuls as “a necessary evil and differentiation between various
classes of persons” that “should certainly be eliminated in an ideal world.” Id. at 246. Tunisia,
however, went along with the proposal, which was adopted unanimously without vote. Id. at
249. On privileges of consuls in the colonial period, see LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 3, at 3-25.
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and immunities afforded by the VCCR were necessary to ensure that
72
a consulate could carry out its functions. Thus, Switzerland, speaking
in favor of the six-delegation proposal, said that “the convention
would serve as a practical guide to . . . consuls throughout the world,
and it would be useful to remind them . . . that the purpose of their
privileges and immunities was not to benefit individuals, but to ensure
the efficient performance of their functions.”73 Germany supported
the proposal “since consuls, like diplomatic agents, were state
74
officials, and both enjoyed privileges and immunities.” Italy, also
supporting the proposal, characterized the phrase as “confirming the
75
functional necessity of granting privileges and immunities.”
Hungary, analogizing to a comparable preamble clause in an earlier
convention on diplomatic relations, supported the proposal because
“persons enjoying privileges and immunities must not use them for
their own advantage.”76 At the drafting conference, no state suggested
that the preamble phrase might negate any right that the VCCR
might give to a sending state national.
Nonetheless, when Mexico requested an advisory opinion from
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the question of
consular access violations in capital cases, the Department of State
argued that the VCCR preamble language about the purpose of
privileges and immunities negated any rights for a foreign national
detainee. The Inter-American Court rejected the argument, just as
the delegates at the 1963 conference had done. The Court said that
the preamble phrase referred to consular officers. It said that it had
examined the drafting history of the phrase, which would be the
statements of delegates just cited, and that they reflect the fact that it
is consular officers, not sending-state nationals, who enjoy “privileges
77
and immunities” under the VCCR.
The Inter-American Court also pointed out that the United
States had argued just the opposite as to individual rights when it was
in its interest to do so—in the United States’ ICJ case against Iran for

72. See infra notes 73-76.
73. Consideration of the draft articles on consular relations adopted by the International
Law Commission at its thirteenth session (A/CONF.25/6), supra note 70, ¶ 8.
74. Id. ¶ 22.
75. Id. ¶ 18.
76. Id. ¶ 25.
77. The Right to Information in Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees
of the Due Process of Law, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, ¶ 74 (Oct. 1, 1999).
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the hostage-taking at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts.78 In that
case, filed in 1979, the United States sued Iran for violation of the
VCCR on the grounds that consuls were prevented from fulfilling
their functions and that U.S. nationals in Iran were deprived of
79
consular services. In a brief submitted to the ICJ, the United States
wrote that the VCCR gives rights to those in need of consular aid,
namely foreign nationals present in a receiving state.80 The InterAmerican Court averred that this earlier position was in contradiction
81
to the one the United States was then urging it to adopt.
The fact that the United States resorted to its argument about
the meaning of the preamble phrase fueled the unilateralism charge,
because it left the impression that the United States was not making
genuine contentions but instead was seeking a pretext for violating
VCCR Article 36.
B. The U.S. Position on Remedies for a Violation of Consular Access
Nor did other states find plausibility in the U.S. position on
remedies for a consular access violation. In international law,
82
whenever a state violates a right, a remedy is required. Ubi ius, ibi
remedium (“Where there is a right, there is a remedy”) is a principle
at the core of the rule of law, both in domestic law and in
international law. How this principle might play out in a particular
case might vary, but the United States took a position against any
kind of remedy when consular access is violated, other than, perhaps,
an apology to the government of the sending state.83 In the briefs filed
78. Id. at 47, ¶ 75 (citing Memorial of the Government of the United States of America,
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. Pleadings 174
(Jan. 12, 1980)).
79. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 7,
24-25 (May 24).
80. Memorial of the Government of the United States of America, supra note 78.
81. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees
of Due Process of Law, supra note 77, at 47, ¶ 75 (“[I]n the Case Concerning United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, the United States linked Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations with the rights of the nationals of the sending State.”).
82. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, annex, pt.
2, art. 31, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001) (“The responsible State is under an obligation
to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.”).
83. See U.S. Department of State to Embassy of Mexico, Sept. 23, 1997, in DIGEST OF U.S.
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1991-1999 (2000), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/65746.pdf (apologizing for the failure of officials to notify Mario
Murphy, a Mexican national, of his right to consular notification); see also Embassy of the
United States of America, Statement of the United States of America Concerning the Failure of
Consular Notification in the Case of Angel Breard (Nov. 3, 1998), available at http://www
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by the Latin American states, and by the European Union in the U.S.
Supreme Court, one finds refutation of the U.S. position both as to
84
individual rights and as to remedies.
Although the argument pressed most strongly by the United
States at the international level to refute any remedy for a consular
access violation was, as indicated, that VCCR Article 36 provided no
right to the individual, the U.S. Supreme Court focused instead on the
remedy aspect. When asked to provide a remedy for a consular access
violation, it said that it would assume for the moment that VCCR
Article 36 provides a right to consular notification, because, in its
85
view, even if that is so, there is no basis for a judicial remedy. The
Department of State, to be sure, also denied that there was a basis for
a judicial remedy, but its main line of argument was that this position
flowed from a lack of an individual right.
In the LaGrand Case in the ICJ, for example, the Department of
State argued that an apology to the sending state suffices as a remedy,
but that nothing need be done to change the conviction or sentence of
86
the sending state national. The ICJ ruled against that position.
Referring to the proposition in international law that a wrongful act
calls for a remedy, it said that rights of the individual were involved
and that “review and reconsideration” must be given to the
conviction and sentence in light of the consular access violation.87
When Mexico then sued in the ICJ, the United States, having lost
on the rights issue and on the issue of whether a remedy is required,
argued that the remedy need not be judicial; instead, it contended
that a receiving state might handle consular access claims by its
88
procedures for executive clemency. The ICJ rejected that argument,
saying that if a court were presented with a claim of a consular access
89
violation, it must entertain the claim.

.state.gov/documents/organization/65829.pdf (conveying “apologies to the Government and
people of Paraguay” for the failure of consular notification for Breard, who had been executed
April 14, 1998).
84. Brief of Foreign Sovereigns in Support of Petitioner, Medeillin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660
(2005) (No. 04-5928); Brief of Amici Curiae the European Union and Members of the
Interntational Community in Support of Petitioner, id.
85. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 342-50 (2006).
86. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 513 (June 27).
87. See id. at 513-14.
88. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12,
65-66 (Mar. 31).
89. Id. at 65-66 (Mar. 31).
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In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,90 the U.S. Supreme Court, not
considering itself to be constrained by the rulings of the ICJ, adopted
the view of the Department of State that no judicial remedy is
required. It said that, for a particular remedy to be required, it
needed to be specified in the text of the treaty itself, and since neither
VCCR Article 36 nor any other provision of the VCCR specified
suppression of an incriminating statement—the remedy sought by
Sanchez-Llamas—it need not consider whether it was an appropriate
remedy.91 In the Supreme Court’s analysis, the absence of any
provision about remedies in the VCCR threw the matter to domestic
92
law, as to what remedy, if any, was to be given.
The position that the Supreme Court adopted on remedies in
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon was in direct conflict with the position in
international law that a remedy is required where a wrong is
93
committed. In treaties, one finds typically a set of obligations but
does not find a list of remedies in case those obligations are violated.
Nonetheless, remedies are required in international law for violation
of a treaty provision. A separate body of international law on
remedies deals with that matter, much in the way the law of remedies
emerged in the domestic law in England with regard to breach of
contract. The relevant body of rules in international law is called the
law of state responsibility,94 which provides rules on remedy that, in
brief, call for restoration of the prior-existing situation if that is
physically possible.95 Failing the possibility of such restoration, the
96
rules call for money damages.
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF VCCR ARTICLE 36 BY OTHER
STATES
The positions that the United States took concerning rights and
remedies under VCCR Article 36 left it quite isolated among the
states of the world in arguing that VCCR Article 36 gives no right to
the individual and that no judicial remedy is required. Since
implementation of a treaty by other states is one technique of

90. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 353.
91. Id. at 346-47.
92. Id. at 343.
93. John Quigley, Must Treaty Violations Be Remedied?: A Critique of Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, 36 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 355, 365-66 (2008).
94. Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 38 (Sept. 25).
95. G.A. Res. 56/83, annex, pt.2, ch. II, art. 35, U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001).
96. Id. art. 36.
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determining a treaty’s meaning, the Department of State sought to
demonstrate that other states fail to provide judicial remedies for a
consular access violation to bolster its position. The Department of
State has presented analyses to U.S. courts and has convinced a
number of courts that because other states party to the VCCR do not
provide remedies, the VCCR does not require U.S. courts to do so
either.97
The Department of State’s analyses of court practices abroad,
however, have been inaccurate and incomplete. In a U.S. Court of
Appeals case in which a foreign national sought to suppress a
confession for failure to advise about consular access, the Department
advised the court that the foreign courts do not suppress.
“Conversely,” the Department stated,
we are aware of two jurisdictions, Italy and Australia, in which
courts have rejected requests by individuals for a remedy in the
context of a criminal proceeding of a violation of Article 36 of the
VCCR. These are the Yater case, decided in Italy in 1973, and the
Abbrederis case, decided in Australia in 1981. Copies of reports of
98
both decisions have been provided to the Department of Justice.

Neither the Australian case nor the Italian case, however,
involved a refusal to provide a remedy for a failure to advise about
consular access. In R. v. Abbrederis, the foreign national sought to
suppress a statement made during questioning upon his arrival from
abroad at the Sydney International Airport because he was not
advised about consular access. After customs personnel found a
substance they thought to be heroin, the man made self-incriminating
statements.99 He sought suppression for failure to advise about
consular access. Declining to do so, the Court of Criminal Appeal of
New South Wales said:
The objection [by the defendant to the admission of his statement]
in my view has no merit. Even giving the fullest weight to the
prescriptions in [VCCR] art. 36 I do not see how it can be
contended that they in any way affect the carrying out of an
investigation by interrogation of a foreign person coming to this
country. The article is dealing with freedom of communication
between consuls and their nationals. It says nothing touching upon

97. E.g. De Los Santos Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 188, 189 n.5 (2008).
98. Letter from David Andrews, Legal Adviser, Department of State, to James K.
Robinson, Assistant Attorney General, supra note 63, at A-9.
99. R. v. Abbrederis (1981) 36 A.L.R. 109 (Austl.), 51 F.L.R 99, 100-01.
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the ordinary process of an investigation by way of interrogation. In
100
my view this ground of appeal is not made good.

The Court of Criminal Appeal thus reasoned that questioning of
a person “coming into this country” is not a detention that entails an
obligation to advise about consular access. Since the court considered
that there was, in the circumstances, no obligation to advise, the case
says nothing about remedies for a failure to advise.101
Also, in Yater, a British national convicted of crime in Italy
invoked VCCR Article 36 along with an article on consular access
found in a bilateral Italy-UK consular treaty.102 Italian authorities did
not notify a British consul about the arrest, but it is not clear from the
case report that Yater’s attorney ever asserted that Italian authorities
did not inform Yater about consular access. Although the Court of
Cassation asked whether there was a violation of either the bilateral
treaty or of Article 36 because of the failure to notify a British consul,
it did not indicate whether Yater was informed of the right of
consular access, or, if he was, whether he requested consular access.103
The Court of Cassation, moreover, did not refer to the fact that
VCCR Article 36 requires advice about consular access to be given to
a detained foreign national. The case is thus of little relevance on the
consequences of a failure to inform a foreign national about consular
access.104
In Australia, moreover, cases have been decided by appellate
courts suppressing statements or material evidence gained following
an arrest where the foreign national was not advised about consular
105
access. These cases are inconsistent with the proposition the State
106
Department derives from R. v. Abbrederis. One case involved a

100. Id. at 115.
101. See id.
102. Cassazione Penal, sez.un., 19 feb. 1973, Guir. It. 1973, II, 464 (translated into English in
77 I.L.R. 541).
103. Id. at 542.
104. Id.
105. See infra notes 106, 113.
106. The Supreme Court, in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, sought to discount these cases as
having been decided on the basis of the Australian statutory provision that incorporates VCCR
Article 36 into domestic Australian law, rather than on VCCR Article 36 itself. Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 344 n.3 (2006). The Court’s theory is that Australia went beyond
VCCR Article 36 with its statutory provision. The Australian statute did require that advice
about consular access be given prior to interrogation, whereas VCCR Article 36 makes no
mention of interrogation. But the critical aspect is that the Australian statute mentions nothing
about remedy, and the Australian court thought it necessary to devise a remedy, given that
there had been a violation of the right to consular access.
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Singapore national convicted of importing heroin into Australia.107
Upon arrest, the authorities did not inform him about consular access,
108
but he himself asked to communicate with a Singapore consul. The
109
authorities did not comply but instead interrogated him and elicited
110
a statement that the prosecution sought to introduce at trial. The
Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal said that an Australian
statutory provision implementing Article 36111 was silent as to
112
remedy, but concluded that “the proper exercise of the discretion”
required exclusion of the statement.113
In another Australian case, authorities seized narcotics from the
travel bag of a foreign national detained on suspicion of smuggling
drugs into Australia. The authorities did not inform him about
114
consular access. The prosecution sought to introduce the narcotics
into evidence on the smuggling charge. The Western Australia
Supreme Court said that the detention was unlawful for the failure to
inform about consular access and suppressed the narcotics evidence.115
Nor has the Department mentioned a 2006 decision of the
Constitutional Court of Germany, which calls for consideration of a
remedy when consular access is violated. That court viewed consular
116
access as a right that adheres to the individual foreign national.
Due to a number of factors, there are few reported court cases
worldwide in which consular access violations have been raised in the

107. Tan Seng Kiah v. R., (2001) 160 F.L.R 26, 27-28 (Austl.). The Northern Territory is a
federal territory rather than a state. Its highest court occupies a place comparable to that of a
state.
108. See id. at 36.
109. Id. at 36.
110. Id. at 41.
111. Crimes Act, 1914, 23P (Austl.) (incorporating VCCR Article 36).
112. Tan Seng Kiah v. R., 160 F.L.R. at 37.
113. Id. at 42.
114. R. v. Kok Cheng Tan, (2001) W.A.S.C. No. 275 (Oct. 5). Breyer characterized this case
as an "Australian case considering but declining to suppress evidence based on violation of
same statute." Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 394 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
However, the evidence in question was the narcotics found in the travel bag, and the court did
suppress it.
115. Kok Cheng Tan, 2001 W.A.S.C. No. 275, ¶ 59.
116. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 19, 2006, 2
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 2115/01 (F.R.G) (Case of F. & T.).
See generally Jana Gogolin, Avena and Sanchez-Llamas Come to Germany - The German
Constitutional Court Upholds Rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 8
GERMAN L. J. 261 (2007) (contrasting Case of F. & T. to Sanchez-Llamas).
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courts.117 For example, in civil law systems, preliminary investigation
of a crime is done by an examining magistrate, a law-trained official,
who may resolve consular access claims without having a case
proceed to court.118
VI. CHANGE IN U.S. INTERESTS IN RELATION TO
CONSULAR ACCESS
The reporter who questioned Department of State spokesperson
J. Adam Ereli astutely suggested that capital punishment was relevant
to the U.S. decision to withdraw from the VCCR Optional Protocol.119
The U.S. Department of Justice understands the importance of
compliance with the Protocol in capital cases, as reflected in the
requirements it has set for U.S. attorneys who want permission to
seek capital punishment of a foreign national for violations of federal
criminal law: if a foreign national is being prosecuted, a U.S. attorney
must explain whether consular access obligations were respected.120
Clearly, the Attorney General is aware that non-observance of
consular access obligations may complicate the prosecution of a
capital case.
This aspect of the issue further fueled the unilateralism assertion,
since, by the mid-1990s, the United States was one of a minority of
states that still actively employed capital punishment.121 The states
criticizing the United States for consular access violations were states
that did not use capital punishment and that were concerned that
their nationals could be executed in the United States.122 While they
found the U.S. position on the consequences of a consular access
violation to be invalid regardless of the punishment, their objections
were the most insistent in capital cases. Mexico, as indicated, framed
117. A Canadian trial court declined to suppress an incriminating statement made by a U.S.
national following his arrest for murder but did so on the rationale that, in the situation, he was
not prejudiced, rather than on a rationale that a remedy is never required. R. v. Partak, [2001]
160 C.C.C. (3d) 553, 570 (Can.).
118. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 395-96 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
119. See supra text accompanying note 51.
120. Submissions from the United States Attorney, 9 USAM 10.080(A)(10) (2007).
121. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-15 (2d ed. 1997) (noting the virtual abolition of capital punishment in
Latin America and Europe).
122. See, e.g., Letter from EU Presidency (Ireland) to Susan B. Loving, Chairwoman,
Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board (Apr. 30, 2004) (on file with author) (urging relief for a
Mexican national facing execution in Oklahoma, noting the EU view that capital punishment is
cruel and inhuman, and protesting non-compliance in that case with consular notification
requirements).
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its question for an advisory opinion in the Inter-American Court of
123
Human Rights as one of consular access violations in capital cases.
The reporter’s question to Mr. Ereli about Iran highlighted the
124
change in position on the part of the United States regarding
compulsory dispute settlement for consular issues. In the Iran hostage
situation in 1979, the United States had used the VCCR as one legal
basis for its allegation that Iran acted unlawfully by holding U.S.
officials hostage. At the 1963 drafting conference for the VCCR,
moreover, the United States had been a prime sponsor of compulsory
dispute settlement. At a time when the draft was silent on dispute
settlement, the United States introduced a proposal reading: “Any
dispute arising from the interpretation or application of this
convention shall be submitted at the request of either of the parties to
the International Court of Justice unless an alternative method of
settlement is agreed upon.”125 The U.S. delegate explained
that the codification of international law and the formulation of
measures to ensure compliance with its provisions should go hand
in hand. The response of other delegations to the United States
proposal would make it possible to evaluate their support for
international law and its enforcement by the principal judicial
126
organ of the United Nations.

The U.S. delegate characterized the proposal as dealing “with one of
the most important points connected with the convention on consular
relations.”127 Thus the United States viewed compulsory dispute
settlement as critical to the effectiveness of the proposed consular
convention, and the U.S. delegate, in effect, issued a challenge to the
other states to support compulsory dispute settlement as a
demonstration of their commitment to international law.
In 1963, at the time of the drafting conference, the primary U.S.
concern in consular matters was that U.S. nationals had on occasion
been arrested and detained in the U.S.S.R. without notification of
128
U.S. consuls. Because it was important for its national interests, the
United States sought compulsory dispute settlement as a way of

123. See supra text accompanying note 40.
124. See supra § III.
125. 2 United Nations Conference on Consular Relations Official Records, Mar. 4-Apr. 22,
1963, Vienna Conference on Consular Relations, 61, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/C.1/L.70, (Mar. 8,
1963).
126. 1 United Nations Conference on Consular Relations Official Records, Mar. 4-Apr. 22,
1963, Vienna Conference on Consular Relations, 249, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/6, (Mar. 26, 1963).
127. Id.
128. See LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 3, at 142.
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protecting U.S. nationals. At the drafting conference, Soviet-bloc
states argued unsuccessfully against a judicial remedy in the event of
129
a consular access violation.
A number of states at the conference objected to the U.S.
proposal for a compulsory dispute settlement clause in the VCCR but
were willing to back a separate document to accompany the VCCR to
130
deal with the issue. That approach resulted in adoption of the
Optional Protocol, which the U.S. ratified.131 By the 1990s, however,
the U.S. interests were different, since by then it was other states
making claims of consular access violations against the United States.
VII. A NON-UNILATERALIST EXPLANATION OF THE
WITHDRAWAL
While there is much support for the position that the U.S.
withdrawal from the VCCR Optional Protocol was a measure
undertaken to allow the United States to maintain its idiosyncratic
construction of VCCR Article 36, two scholars have suggested a
different assessment. Reisman and Arsanjani offer the view that, as of
2005, the United States was complying with its obligations under
VCCR Article 36, but withdrawing from the Optional Protocol would
protect the United States from suits motivated by concern over
capital punishment filed by states for which the consular access issue
was secondary. As to U.S. compliance, they write:
The United States had indicated (and the evidence seems to
substantiate the good faith of its effort) that it would henceforth try
to ensure that the rights available to foreign nationals under Article
36 of the VCCR would be made as operational as the federal
government of the United States was capable of making them. This
132
satisfied the obligation under the Convention.

In contrast to an earlier case that Reisman and Arsanjani cite
involving Peru, in which withdrawal from a jurisdictional commitment
appeared aimed at allowing Peru to violate various obligations, they

129. See 1 United Nations Conference on Consular Relations Official Records, Mar. 4-Apr.
22, 1963, Vienna Conference on Consular Relations, 85, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/16, (Apr. 20,
1963) (statement of Mr. Avilov, U.S.S.R.).
130. LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 3, at 577.
131. Optional Protocol, supra note 2.
132. W. Michael Reisman & Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, No Exit? A Preliminary Examination
of the Legal Consequences of United States’ Notification of Withdrawal from the Optional
Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, in PROMOTING JUSTICE, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 897, 925 (Marcelo G.
Kohen ed., 2007).
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argue that the withdrawal would not negatively impact U.S.
compliance. As an indication of the U.S. commitment to compliance,
Reisman and Arsanjani quote a paragraph from the ICJ decision in
LaGrand, in which the ICJ responded to Germany’s request for
assurances of non-repetition of U.S. violations of the obligation to
inform foreign nationals about consular access. There the ICJ stated
that the United States had provided the court with information on its
133
efforts to gain compliance by local law enforcement agencies.
That paragraph in the LaGrand judgment related to efforts by
the United States to secure compliance with the obligation to inform
foreign nationals about consular access but did not relate to the
consequences of non-compliance. The United States did not suggest
to the ICJ that in future it would regard a foreign national as enjoying
a justiciable right, or that any remedy would be given by courts or any
other agency of government. Hence, the United States was not stating
that it would apply the VCCR in the manner the ICJ regarded as
134
correct. To the contrary, the United States has followed its own
construction of what is required in the event of a breach of the
obligation to inform a foreign national.
Reisman and Arsanjani suggest that, given the U.S.
representations to the ICJ about its commitment to compliance,
the essential objective of VCCR Article 36 was fulfilled; exercises
of jurisdiction could not likely achieve much more and, if initiated,
would probably be covert efforts at securing abolition of the death
penalty. It appears likely that the United States felt that states and,
increasingly, non-governmental organizations committed to
abolitionism, would be able to continue to bring cases allegedly
arising under Article 36 of the VCCR to an international tribunal
that could well prove to be increasingly abolitionist in its
orientation. Given the federal structure of the American system,
the proliferation of these cases could have presented serious, if not
insoluble domestic legal and political problems for any US
government. Hence the decision to preempt the problem by
135
denouncing the Optional Protocol.

To be sure, additional ICJ decisions on consular access in capital
cases would present problems for the federal government vis-a-vis the
states. Yet the federal government’s refusal to comply with VCCR
Article 36 may just as well be motivated by a desire to avoid forcing
the states to forego executions. That motivation, however, is no

133. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 511-13 (June 27).
134. See id.
135. Reisman & Arsanjani, supra note 132, at 925.
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excuse for failing to comply with a treaty obligation. Even if Reisman
and Arsanjani are correct in their assessment that the ICJ is
abolitionist in orientation, the ICJ would have no jurisdiction to deal
with capital punishment as such. While it might be swayed in
decisions on consular access violations by the enormity of the
punishment, the ICJ was careful in Avena to say that its jurisdiction
was limited to the VCCR, which led it to decline Mexico’s invitation
136
to analyze a consular access violation as a human rights issue.
Reisman and Arsanjani’s statement that the “essential objective
137
of VCCR Article 36 was fulfilled” overlooked the fact that the
United States has been adamant in its refusal to comply with the
VCCR in the manner in which the ICJ, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, and most other states of the world consider it should
be applied. The “essential objective” has hardly been fulfilled. Quite
the reverse, the United States remains an outlier on the issue of the
consequences of a consular access violation.
VIII. VALIDITY OF THE WITHDRAWAL
Apart from the VCCR Optional Protocol, other states have little
possibility of establishing jurisdiction over the United States to sue in
the ICJ for a consular access violation. The ICJ potentially has
jurisdiction over states by declarations they may file, whereby they
submit to suit by other states for international law violations
generally.138 The United States filed such a declaration in 1946, but
139
retracted it in 1986. That left submission to jurisdiction relating to
particular treaties, such as the VCCR Optional Protocol, as the major
avenue whereby the United States might sue other states in the ICJ
and in turn might be sued. Absent the VCCR Optional Protocol, the
possibility that another state might gain jurisdiction over the United
States in the ICJ for a consular access violation is remote.
The absence of other potential routes to jurisdiction puts the
focus on the validity of the withdrawal. While Department of State
spokespersons provided an explanation of why the United States was
withdrawing, they did not address the withdrawal’s validity. They
136. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12,
60-61 (Mar. 31).
137. See supra text accompanying note 134.
138. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36(2), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
1063 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
139. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra
note 11, ch.1, § 4 n.9.
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obviously viewed the withdrawal as valid.140 However, just as contracts
in domestic law normally carry an obligation not to rescind
unilaterally, so treaties in international law normally must be
honored.141
A. ICJ Competence to Determine the Validity of a Withdrawal
In the ICJ context, moreover, when a state that is subject to
jurisdiction takes action to exempt itself from jurisdiction, the ICJ
views itself as competent to assess whether the action is valid, or
whether the state remains subject to jurisdiction.142 Thus, if a state
party to the Optional Protocol were to sue the United States for a
consular access violation, relying on the Optional Protocol for
jurisdiction and asserting that the withdrawal was invalid, that issue
would be open for the ICJ to decide without deference to the U.S.
view that the withdrawal was valid. In international practice,
international tribunals, including the ICJ, decide their own
competence when a dispute arises over a jurisdictional base asserted
by the plaintiff state.143
A similar situation arose in 1984 for the United States, when it
was sued by Nicaragua on the basis of its 1946 declaration whereby
the U.S. submitted itself to ICJ jurisdiction for international law
144
matters generally. Three days before Nicaragua filed its application
to commence suit, the United States had filed a document with the
ICJ saying that it would not view itself as subject to ICJ jurisdiction
for a period of two years on disputes “related to events in Central
145
America.”
Nicaragua argued that the exemption document did not deprive
the ICJ of jurisdiction. The United States argued that the document
was within its prerogatives and that the ICJ had no jurisdiction. The

140. In a 2007 press statement, the Department of State characterized the withdrawal as
having been done as of right: “we exercised our right to withdraw from the Optional Protocol.”
International Obligations and U.S. Law, STATES NEWS SERVICE, October 16, 2007 (statement
provided by Department of State), http://www.state.gov.
141. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 33 [hereinafter
VCLT].
142. ICJ Statute, supra note 138, art. 36(6).
143. See 2 SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT,
1920-1996, 812 (1997).
144. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 392, 395, 398 (Judgment of Nov. 26).
145. Id. at 398. See also Ilene R. Cohn, Nicaragua v. United States: Pre-Seisin Reciprocity and
the Race to The Hague, 46 OHIO ST. L. J. 699 (1985).
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ICJ, agreeing with Nicaragua, decided that it had jurisdiction.146 That
case, to be sure, involved a unilateral declaration rather than a treaty
submission, but nonetheless, the ICJ’s attention to the validity of the
declaration indicates that it does not automatically honor a retraction
of a state’s prior consent to jurisdiction.
B. Withdrawal From a Treaty That Lacks a Denunciation Clause
The validity of a denunciation or withdrawal from a treaty,
whether the treaty relates to compulsory dispute settlement or to any
other subject, is not a matter within the sole discretion of the state
that denounces or withdraws. Rather, one must look at the particular
treaty to determine if withdrawal is permitted. One possibility is that
the treaty contains a denunciation clause that would provide for
freedom to denounce at will. Many treaties include such a clause. A
primary reason why such a clause would be included is to encourage
states to ratify, since they know that if the commitment they make
turns out to be disadvantageous, they are not bound in perpetuity.147
However, many treaties, including the Optional Protocol, contain
no denunciation clause. In such a circumstance, the situation is less
clear as to whether withdrawal is permitted. From the theoretical
standpoint, the issue poses a dilemma as between two postulates of
the international order. On the one hand, states are viewed as
sovereignty entities, entitled to take action according to their
interests. Haraszti, a Hungarian author writing during the Cold War,
viewed treaty denunciation in this light, arguing that if a particular
treaty did not resolve the issue, then “denunciation will have to be
recognized as following from the principle of international law
demanding respect for state sovereignty.”148
On the other hand, international engagements are viewed as
binding; otherwise states would have little incentive to enter into
them as a means for ordering relations with other states. States are
regarded as being required to keep the promises they make via
treaty.149 If they can ratify one day and denounce the next, the
obligations assumed may carry little meaning.

146. Nicaragua, 1984 I.C.J. at 442.
147. See MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 510 (1961) (on treaties providing for
denunciation).
148. GYÖRGY HARASZTI, SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE LAW OF TREATIES
264 (1973).
149. VCLT, supra note 141, art. 26.
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As a technical matter, the argument is that since denunciation
clauses are well known to treaty drafters, the omission of such a
150
clause implies that denunciation is prohibited. Denunciation clauses
are sufficiently common, especially in multilateral treaties, that one
may reasonably infer that the absence of such a clause reflects an
intention that denunciation not be permitted. Haraszti, arguing for
freedom of denunciation, responds to this argument by saying that
the omission of a denunciation clause may be due to negligence or
inexperience of a treaty’s drafters.151
Neither absolutist position—total freedom to denounce or total
prohibition on denunciation—reflects international practice regarding
treaties containing no denunciation clause. The most generally
recognized rule on the matter is found in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (VCLT), a widely ratified agreement that
regulates major aspects of treaty law. The United States is not a party
to the VCLT but regards it, at least for most of its provisions, as
152
reflecting customary international law on treaty issues. VCLT
Article 56 is titled Denunciation of or withdrawal from a treaty
containing no provision regarding termination, denunciation or
withdrawal. It provides:
1. A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination
and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not
subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless:
(a) it is established that the parties intended to admit the
possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or
(b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by
the nature of the treaty.
2. A party shall give not less than twelve months’ notice of its
intention to denounce or withdraw from a treaty under paragraph
153
1.

Thus, as a matter of procedure in denouncing, VCLT Article
56(2) requires a time period before a withdrawal would be valid. The
United States, in its communication to the U.N. Secretary-General,

150. See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 290 (2007).
151. HARASZTI, supra note 148, at 269.
152. 65 DEP’T ST. BULL. 684, 685 (1971) (report to Senate by Secretary of State William
Rogers, stating, “Although not yet in force, the Convention is already generally recognized as
the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice”); Chubb v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d
301, 308 (2d Cir. 2000); see also HARASZTI, supra note 148, at 277 (stating that when
denunciation is permitted, “a certain period must be allowed to pass between the notification of
denunciation, and the termination of the treaty”).
153. VCLT, supra note 141, art. 56.
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gave no time period, apparently purporting to make its withdrawal
154
effective immediately.
On the basic issue of whether a state may denounce, the validity
of a withdrawal, according to VCLT Article 56(1), turns on what kind
of treaty is involved, and whether one can ascertain the parties’ desire
even though the text of the treaty was silent. Arnold McNair, author
of a mid-century treatise on the law of treaties, said that where a
treaty is silent on denunciation, “[i]t is a question of the intention of
the parties which can be inferred from the terms of the treaty, the
circumstances in which it was concluded, and the nature of the
155
subject-matter.” McNair thus put what is encompassed in the two
sub-paragraphs of Article 56(1) into a single concept, namely, the
intent of the parties, which could be ascertained through his threeprong test. As to the subject-matter prong, McNair’s idea is
apparently that with treaties on certain subjects, one may fairly
assume that the parties contemplated the possibility of
denunciation.156 VCLT Article 56(1), on the other hand, separates the
type of treaty (paragraph 1(b)) from the intent of the parties
(paragraph 1(a)). Even if one regards that as a separate basis, it
probably does, as McNair suggests, relate to what the parties
anticipated about possible denunciation when they entered into the
treaty.
C.Whether the States Party to the VCCR Optional Protocol Viewed
Denunciation as Possible
VCLT Article 56 is generally read as creating a presumption
against a possibility of denunciation in treaties that are silent on the
subject.157 The most natural reading of Article 56 is that a treaty is not
subject to denunciation unless one of the two sub-paragraph factors is
satisfied. If one cannot ascertain from statements made that there was
an intent to allow denunciation and if the treaty by its “nature” does
not imply freedom of denunciation, then it is not subject to
denunciation.

154. See also 65 DEP’T ST. BULL. 684, 688 (1971) (Secretary of State Rogers stating that a
dispute settlement process is required for a withdrawal from a treaty, that a withdrawing state
must inform all other parties to the treaty and afford them an opportunity to object).
155. MCNAIR, supra note 147, at 511.
156. Id. at 513.
157. Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1594 (2005) (stating that art.
56 creates “a rebuttable presumption that states may not unilaterally exit from a treaty that
lacks a denunciation or withdrawal clause”).
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VCLT Article 56 also seems to require a party seeking to
withdraw from a treaty silent as to denunciation to carry a burden:
“Since the grounds for justifying withdrawal are expressed as an
exception, the onus of establishing that the exception applies lies on
158
the party wishing to withdraw.” The fact that denunciation clauses
are written into many treaties is taken to strengthen that
presumption, since it is well known to treaty drafters that if they want
to make denunciation a possibility they have the option of including a
denunciation clause.159
With the Optional Protocol, there is little in the drafting history
to show what the parties may have thought about denunciation. No
denunciation clause was proposed, and no delegate mentioned
160
denunciation. What we do have, however, is the U.S. statement,
quoted above, about the importance of compulsory dispute
settlement.161 The United States, as a proponent of compulsory
dispute settlement in the VCCR, viewed it as central to the entire
enterprise of concluding a consular treaty. That view of the centrality
of compulsory dispute settlement suggests that states, once having
agreed to compulsory dispute settlement, should not be free to
repudiate it.
As seen above, compulsory dispute settlement was put off to a
separate protocol as the VCCR was being drafted. That change might
suggest that other states viewed compulsory dispute settlement as less
central than did the United States. However, the aim behind the
technique of a separate protocol was to maximize participation in the
VCCR itself, since it would allow states unwilling to submit to ICJ
jurisdiction to become parties to the VCCR without having to reserve
162
to the submission clause. Thus, it may be hazardous to draw
conclusions about the centrality of compulsory dispute settlement
from the fact it was put into a separate protocol.

158. AUST, supra note 150, at 290.
159. Id. (“Since it is now very common to include provisions on withdrawal, when a treaty is
silent about the matter, it may be that much harder for a party to establish the grounds for the
exception.”).
160. See 1 United Nations Conference on Consular Relations Official Records, Mar. 4-Apr.
22, 1963, Vienna Conference on Consular Relations, 249-51, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/6, (Mar. 26,
1963).
161. See supra text accompanying note 126.
162. See 1 United Nations Conference on Consular Relations Official Records, Mar. 4-Apr.
22, 1963, Vienna Conference on Consular Relations, 249-51, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/6, (Mar. 26,
1963).
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D. Whether the VCCR Optional Protocol by Its Nature is
Susceptible of Denunciation
Regarding the VCCR Optional Protocol, there is little basis in
the drafting history to show an expression of intent that denunciation
should be permitted, which leaves open the question of whether the
VCCR Optional Protocol is the type of treaty in which a possibility of
denunciation can be assumed. There has been little state practice on
the matter, hence it is less than clear what types of treaty imply a
freedom of denunciation.163 The types of treaties generally thought to
imply a right of denunciation are treaties premised on a close
relationship between the contracting states. Treaties of alliance,
involving perhaps a mutual defense commitment, have been viewed
in this light, because a state would not want to commit itself to going
to war absent close affinity. Hence, if the two states, once close,
drifted apart, then either might denounce.
Another type of treaty in this category is a treaty of friendship,
commerce, and navigation, which typically allows nationals of each
state to engage in business in the other state on a basis of equality
with locals.164 That agreement is, like a treaty of alliance, premised on
good relations between the two states, since the nationals of the other
165
state gain access to markets and trade in the other. A third type is a
treaty establishing an international organization. There the concept is
that a state need not continue as a member of an organization that
may move in directions not to its liking. Even as to these three types
of treaties, however, state practice is scant.166
The ICJ addressed the question of the permissibility of
denunciation of a treaty containing no denunciation clause in a
dispute between Hungary and Slovakia over a bilateral treaty where
the two were to build joint water diversion facilities on the Danube
River. After Hungary denounced, the ICJ found the treaty to be of a
type that implied that denunciation was not anticipated:
The 1977 Treaty does not contain any provision regarding its
termination. Nor is there any indication that the parties intended to
admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal. On the
contrary, the Treaty establishes a long-standing and durable régime

163. See MCNAIR, supra note 147, at 513.
164. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 331 (1963).
165. Id. (stating the treaties of alliance and of commerce are “intended to be susceptible of
denunciation even though they contain no express term to that effect”).
166. Kelvin Widdows, The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing No Denunciation
Clause, 53 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 83, 96 (1982).
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of joint investment and joint operation. Consequently, the parties
not having agreed otherwise, the Treaty could be terminated only
167
on the limited grounds enumerated in the Vienna Convention.

Although the VCCR Optional Protocol does not contemplate a joint
financial undertaking, it, like the treaty at issue between Hungary and
Slovakia, contained no provision regarding its termination. As well,
with the VCCR Optional Protocol, there is no “indication that the
parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or
withdrawal.”
Treaties on compulsory dispute settlement have been mentioned
by one author as a potential category where a possibility of
denunciation may be presumed,168 but state practice provides little
support for the assertion.169
Aust, nonetheless, argues that dispute settlement treaties are
subject to denunciation in absence of a denunciation clause. His
rationale is as follows:
This is consistent with the consensual nature of international
jurisdiction: a state can be made subject to the jurisdiction of an
international court or tribunal only if it consents, either in advance
or ad hoc. Moreover, states have withdrawn from such optional
protocols on dispute settlement to several UN treaties without (at
least legal) objection, even when they contain no provision for
170
this.

Aust’s reliance on an absence of objection when dispute
settlement treaties are denounced is questionable. In theory, other
states party to the VCCR Optional Protocol might send a diplomatic
protest note to the United States if they view the withdrawal as
invalid. Or they might communicate their protest to the U.N.
Secretary-General as the depositary agency. In rare instances, states
have done this when a state party has denounced a treaty lacking a
denunciation clause.171 However, there is no established procedure for
reacting to a denunciation by another state party.172 Thus, there is
little basis for drawing any conclusion from an absence of formal
objection. The matter would most likely be raised, as suggested
167. Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 62-63 (Sept. 25).
168. AUST, supra note 150, at 291 (“It will usually be possible to withdraw from a general
treaty for the settlement of disputes between the parties even when it has no withdrawal
provision.”).
169. Widdows, supra note 166, at 96-98.
170. AUST, supra note 150, at 291.
171. See, e.g., United Nations, supra note 11, ch. 21, § 1 n.8 (UK objecting that unilateral
denunciation of Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone is not permitted).
172. On that procedure, see VCLT, supra note 141, arts. 19-21.
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above, if a state party to the Optional Protocol were to file suit
against the United States in the ICJ for a VCCR violation.
Aust asserts that there have been withdrawals from optional
protocols to UN treaties but only cites to the U.S. withdrawal from
173
the VCCR Optional Protocol as evidence. A search by the present
author in other treaties of this category revealed no other instances of
withdrawal. It is believed that there are no other instances Aust could
cite.
Aust also mentions the “consensual nature of international
jurisdiction” as a reason that denunciation should be freely allowed
from dispute settlement treaties. To be sure, submission to
international judicial jurisdiction is at the discretion of a state, but
entry into any treaty is at the discretion of the state. Any obligation a
state assumes by treaty on any topic is “consensual,” since no state is
required to enter into any treaty. Hence Aust’s argument, logically,
would lead to the conclusion that any treaty that lacks a denunciation
clause may be denounced, a conclusion clearly at odds with VCLT
Article 56.
One could perhaps argue that agreeing to compulsory dispute
resolution implies a close relation with the other states, thus putting
such treaties into the category of those that may be freely denounced.
However, many states have agreed, as through the ICJ Statute Article
36(b) procedure for compulsory dispute resolution or through the
VCCR Optional Protocol itself to compulsory dispute resolution with
174
a wide variety of states not particularly close to them in any sense.
E. Validity of the U.S. Withdrawal from the VCCR Optional
Protocol
Since the adoption of the VCLT, there is little state practice on
175
denunciation of treaties containing no denunciation clause. But in
the few instances where the issue has arisen, objections have been
recorded. In one instance, Senegal purported to withdraw from two
“law of the sea” treaties, leading the UK to object that withdrawal

173. AUST, supra note 150, at 291 n.68.
174. See United Nations, supra note 11, ch. 3, § 10 (listing states with a variety of political
orientations as ratifies of the VCCR Optional Protocol).
175. Reisman & Arsanjani, supra note 132, at 913-16. A treaty containing a denunciation
clause, the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, has
been denounced by Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago. Under that Optional Protocol,
states party to the ICCPR agree to allowing for complaints to be filed against them by individual
persons before a monitoring committee.
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was impermissible.176 Also, North Korea withdrew from the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, drawing
177
and from the
objection from the U.N. Secretary-General
178
monitoring committee that oversees implementation.
With the VCCR Optional Protocol, there is no indication of an
intent to permit denunciation in the drafting history. It also does not
readily fall into the category of treaties that can be freely denounced.
Were another state party to sue, the United States would need to
sustain a burden on these issues, but judging from what international
practice has been recorded, the U.S. would face an uphill argument.
Its position that the VCCR Optional Protocol can be freely
denounced is difficult to sustain on the basis of VCLT Article 56 and
international practice.
IX. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WITHDRAWAL
The U.S. withdrawal from the VCCR Optional Protocol, even if
valid, would not affect cases already filed in the ICJ. Under ICJ
procedure, future action is possible on cases already filed, even after
final judgment, since under the ICJ Statute, a state that is party to a
case may seek clarification of a judgment already issued.179 In 2008,
Mexico requested interpretation of the Avena judgment before the
ICJ, after one of its nationals was scheduled for execution without a
review of his conviction.180 Mexico’s request is not precluded by the
U.S. withdrawal from the VCCR Optional Protocol.181
176. Supra note 172.
177. United Nations, supra note 11, ch. 4, § 4 n.8 (“As the Covenant does not contain a
withdrawal provision, the Secretariat of the United Nations forwarded on 23 September 1997 an
aide-mémoire to the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea explaining the
legal position arising from the above notification. As elaborated in this aide-mémoire, the
Secretary-General is of the opinion that a withdrawal from the Covenant would not appear
possible unless all States Parties to the Covenant agree with such a withdrawal.”).
178. U.N. Human Rights Comm. [UNHRC], General Comment No Continuity of
Obligations, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1 (Dec. 8, 1997) (taking the position that a
human rights treaty creates rights for a population, and that this may not be revoked).
179. ICJ Statute, supra note 138, art. 60.
180. Application Instituting Proceedings of Mexico, Request for Interpretation of the
Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex.
v. U.S.) (Mex. v. U.S.), (June 5, 2008), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14
582.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2008); see also Press Release, Int’l Court of Justice, Mexico files a
Request for interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the case concerning Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) and asks for the urgent indication
of provisional measures (June 5, 2008), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/
14578.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2008) (Mexico invoking article 60 of the ICJ Statute).
181. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 13 March 2004 in the Case Concerning
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Additionally, a state in whose favor the ICJ has ruled may
approach the U.N. Security Council, which is empowered to take
enforcement measures, if the other state fails to comply with the
ruling.182 That procedure, similarly, is not precluded by a withdrawal
for cases already decided.
The United States, as Secretary Rice explained, continues as a
party to the VCCR. Withdrawal from the Optional Protocol, she said,
would not impact the commitment of the United States to complying
with the VCCR and in particular, with Article 36. The Department of
State has posted advisory messages for law enforcement agencies
stressing that the withdrawal from the Optional Protocol does not
diminish their obligation to respect consular access when they arrest
183
foreign nationals.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has referred to the
withdrawal as support for a more limited construction of VCCR
Article 36. In Bustillo v. Virginia, the Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether it should give weight to the ICJ’s view that
procedural default rules should not be used to bar consideration of a
184
consular access claim. Deciding that it need not give any weight to
the ICJ’s view, the Supreme Court referred to the withdrawal as an
additional reason for ignoring the ICJ’s view:
Moreover, shortly after Avena, the United States withdrew from
the Optional Protocol concerning Vienna Convention disputes.
Whatever the effect of Avena and LaGrand before this withdrawal,
it is doubtful that our courts should give decisive weight to the
interpretation of a tribunal whose jurisdiction in this area is no
185
longer recognized by the United States.

The withdrawal cannot appropriately be taken to have such an effect.
The United States is party to the ICJ Statute and was party to the
consular access cases filed by Paraguay, Germany, and Mexico.
However the Supreme Court resolves the issue of the weight to be
given to ICJ decisions, it should not accord them less weight because
of the 2005 withdrawal. Taking that approach will simply make it

Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (Mex. v. U.S.), 2009 I.C.J. _ (Jan. 19),
http://www.ic j-cij.org (where ICJ declined on other grounds to provide a clarification).
182. U.N. Charter art. 94, para 2.
183. See, e.g., Memorandum from U.S. Department of State, Announcement: All Consular
Notification Requirements Remain in Effect, available at http://travel.state.gov/new-s/news_
2155.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2008).
184. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 352-53 (2006).
185. Id. at 355.
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easier for the Supreme Court to persist in espousing the executive
branch’s idiosyncratic construction of VCCR Article 36.
A. U.S. Inability to Sue
The withdrawal limits U.S. access to the ICJ on consular issues.
One cannot know what events might cause the United States to find it
advantageous to sue for a consular law violation, but the possibility
can hardly be precluded. In the 1970s, the United States did not
expect it would soon be dealing with a hostage-taking at consular
offices, but when that did occur in Iran in 1979, one of the first
responses of the United States was to file a complaint in the ICJ,
using the VCCR Optional Protocol as a jurisdictional ground to
allege violations of consular law by Iran.186 The United States viewed
an ICJ decision condemning Iran for the hostage-taking as an
important element as it sought to mobilize world opinion in its favor.
Iran at the time, explaining the hostage-taking, highlighted the
previous history of U.S. actions in Iran, which involved helping
overturn a democratically elected government in 1953 and bringing in
a government that came to be viewed as oppressive. Iran asked the
ICJ not to deal with the U.S. complaint unless it simultaneously
considered “more than 25 years of continual interference by the
United States in the internal affairs of Iran.”187 The occupation of U.S.
diplomatic and consular offices was accompanied by the opening of
archives, whose contents were made public to show what the United
States had done. Iran sought to put those acts in the context of what it
viewed as the United States’ improper interference.188 The unanimous
decision the U.S. gained from the ICJ helped marshal sentiment in its
favor, over and against such assertions by Iran.
In the present world situation, as in 1979, the United States is
189
resented in many quarters, and it is not difficult to imagine that the
United States might experience infringements against its consular
posts. Consulates have long been a ready target for demonstrations
by locals seeking to draw attention to policies of a sending state. One
need only recall actions at Danish diplomatic and consular posts in

186. See Application Instituting Proceedings of United States, United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1982 I.C.J. Pleadings 3, 3-5 (Nov. 29, 1979).
187. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 180 I.C.J. 3, 8-9
(May 24).
188. Id.
189. See generally John Quigley, International Law Violations by the United States in the
Middle East as a Factor Behind Anti-American Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 815 (2002).
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reaction to the publication in Denmark of comic strips relating to the
190
Prophet Mohammed. In Beirut, a Danish consulate was set on fire.
In 2006, a U.S. foreign service officer working at the U.S. consulate in
Karachi, Pakistan, was killed in apparent protest of a scheduled visit
191
to Pakistan by President George W. Bush. Such situations implicate
the obligations of the receiving state to provide protection.
The United States may be in a position where it desires to sue for
a variety of consular law violations, since under the VCCR, consuls
192
enjoy a variety of immunities from local jurisdiction. As of this
writing, a dispute remains unresolved between the United States and
United Kingdom over the imposition of a “congestion charge,”
requiring payment from drivers who commute by car into central
193
London. The UK expects consuls to pay. The United States refuses
to pay, considering the charge as a “tax”—a characterization that
would provide an exemption for consuls.194 The UK regards the
charge as a fee comparable to a road toll, which is collectable from
consuls under an exception clause that specifies that a fee for services
is not a tax.195 Were the United States to seek to sue the UK in the
ICJ, it would probably find no jurisdictional base apart from the
VCCR Optional Protocol.
B. The Potential of Responsive Action by Other States
Despite the Department of State’s position that the United
States will continue to abide by the VCCR, the United States insists
on constructions of VCCR Article 36 that are viewed by a virtually
unanimous community of nations as groundless. On the basis of
international law principles as generally applied, it is difficult to find
justification for the U.S. positions. As the United States, despite its
protestations, is viewed by many as being in breach of VCCR Article
36, foreign states continue to protest when foreign nationals are

190. Megan Stack, Beirut Rioters Attack Church, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, at A1.
191. Kamran Khan and John Lancaster, Pakistan Blast Kills U.S. Diplomat, WASH. POST,
Mar. 3, 2006, at A10; Declan Walsh, Car bombing: Explosion at US consulate in Karachi kills
diplomat, GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 3, 2006, at 22.
192. LEE & QUIGLEY, supra note 3, at 339-511.
193. Ben Webster, US diplomats ‘owe £1m in fines’, TIMES (London), Nov. 29, 2006, at 30.
194. See VCCR, supra note 1, art. 49, § 1.
195. See id., art. 49, § 1(e).
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arrested and convicted of crime, if advice as to consular access is not
196
given at the time of arrest.
While insisting on rights for U.S. nationals under arrest, U.S.
consuls have already been confronted with the country’s own spotty
record of compliance. Such instances have become sufficiently
numerous that the Department of State has felt it necessary to
provide instruction to U.S. consuls on how to react. The instruction
reads that if a receiving state official, upon being asked to facilitate
consular access, replies that the United States does not respect the
rights of foreign nationals, a consul should say:
a. Even where this might be true, it does not exempt the host
government from its treaty obligations. Two wrongs do not make a
right. We should all work toward improved compliance with
consular notification obligations.
b. Given the multinational and multi-ethnic makeup of the U.S., it
is difficult to identify a person as a foreign national unless he/she
claims such nationality or has appropriate documentation.
c. Unfortunately, the size and composition of U.S. law enforcement
(local, county, State, Federal) make it difficult to ensure that every
arresting official understands the obligation to notify foreign
197
consuls.

Foreign states may, if they choose, take action against the United
States in response to what they view as U.S. non-compliance with
VCCR Article 36. Under international law, a state whose rights are
violated may undertake countermeasures against the other state.198
Although a state’s countermeasures regarding consular access may be
limited because such measures may not affect human rights,199 other
states could take countermeasures affecting, for example, trade
relations in a way that could harm U.S. financial interests.
Moreover, other states party to the VCCR may be able to restrict
the rights of U.S. nationals within the framework of the VCCR itself,
without resorting to countermeasures as such. The VCCR requires
states party to treat other states party equally, but with an exception:
1. In the application of the provisions of the present Convention the
receiving State shall not discriminate as between States.
2. However, discrimination shall not be regarded as taking place:

196. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae the European Union and Members of the International
Community in Support of Petitioner, Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984).
197. 7 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Foreign Affairs Manual § 421.2-3 (2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86605.pdf.
198. G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 82, pt. 3, ch. 2, art. 49.
199. Id. art. 50.
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(a) where the receiving State applies any of the provisions of
the present Convention restrictively because of a restrictive
application of that provision to its consular posts in the sending
200
State[.]

VCCR Article 72 thus creates the possibility that other states may
apply VCCR Article 36 in relation to U.S. nationals in a “restrictive”
way if the U.S. applies it in a restrictive way to their nationals. As a
result, a state in which a U.S. national is convicted and sentenced to
prison without having been advised about consular access might take
the position that its courts need not entertain a claim for the consular
access violation, because U.S. courts would not entertain such a claim
for one of their nationals.
Hopefully, this route will not be taken since states in general
prefer to apply treaty provisions relating to individuals in a uniform
way, regardless of nationality. The German Constitutional Court, for
example, in a decision rendered eighteen months after the U.S.
withdrawal from the Optional Protocol, indicated that Germany will
apply VCCR Article 36 in the way the ICJ reads it, namely to provide
rights for individuals and to afford access to a court for a possible
201
remedy in case of violation. Germany is likely to afford such rights
to U.S. nationals, even if the United States does not afford them to
German nationals.
The current U.S. course in regard to the VCCR poses potential
risk to the United States in protecting its own interests and in
protecting U.S. nationals. The perceived self-interest of the United
States in protecting itself from suits may turn out to be less significant
than an interest in protecting both itself and U.S. nationals.
X. THE ADVISABILITY OF RE-ADHERENCE TO THE
OPTIONAL PROTOCOL
The Department of State clearly is concerned about whether it
can adequately represent the interests of U.S. nationals in the face of
the U.S. performance under, and attitude toward, VCCR Article 36.
The State Department has made representations on occasion, as
indicated above, to governors asking for a reprieve on behalf of a
condemned foreign national, citing concern for its ability to protect
U.S. nationals.202 To date, however, the United States has not been
200. VCCR, supra note 1, art. 72, § 1.
201. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sep. 19, 2006,
2 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 2115/01 (¶¶ 65, 68) (F.R.G.).
202. See supra § II.
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sufficiently concerned to modify its own position, which is at the heart
of the problem. The executive branch, notwithstanding the ICJ
decisions in the LaGrand and Avena cases, continues to tell the courts
that foreign nationals have no rights under VCCR Article 36 and that
courts do not have to consider remedies when consular access
obligations are violated.203 Judicial remedies might have a salutary
impact on compliance by police, which might reduce the number of
violations.
U.S. state and federal courts, in the main, are deciding claims by
foreign nationals of consular access violations in line with the
Department of State position. In 2006, as mentioned above, the U.S.
Supreme Court declined to suppress an incriminating statement made
204
by a Mexican national. In the same ruling, the Supreme Court
rejected the consular access claim of a foreign national who raised his
claim only in post-conviction proceedings.205 Yet, the ICJ specifically
ruled previously in the LaGrand case that rules on the timing of
presentation of claims may not be used to bar a consular access claim,
given that states that have violated an international norm must do
206
what they can to provide redress.
The U.S. Supreme Court and Department of State’s construction
of VCCR Article 36 carries the risk that the United States will not
only be viewed as being incorrect on a legal matter, but also as
disingenuous and as using its power position to disregard the law. The
U.S. views have been rejected by two international courts and by the
other states party to the VCCR; nonetheless, the Department is not
altering its course. In 2008, in an amicus curiae brief for the United
States, the Department of State again told a U.S. court that the
preamble language of the VCCR negates an individual right, and the
207
court relied on that opinion as it denied a claim.

203. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 29, Medellin v.
Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984) (“Permitting private judicial enforcement in the
absence of action from the President or the Congress would deprive the political branches of the
very choice of means that the ICJ intended for them to have. Thus, while petitioner is entitled to
review and reconsideration by virtue of the President's determination, such review and
reconsideration would not be available to petitioner in the absence of the President's
determination.”).
204. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
205. See id.
206. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 497-98 (June 27).
207. See Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 196-97 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating that the preamble
language reflected the fact that VCCR governs inter-state relations only).
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The United States should revise its severely battered
construction of VCCR Article 36, both because it would thereby
conform to the construction used by other states party and because its
own constructions are difficult to square with legal principle. A
modification of the U.S. positions along these lines would not only
bring the United States into compliance with the obligations it has
undertaken towards foreign states and their nationals but would also
greatly assist U.S. consuls in protecting U.S. nationals abroad.
Ultimately, the United States could enhance respect for the VCCR,
and for itself, by retracting its withdrawal from the VCCR Optional
Protocol.

